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. . . The 175th Meeting of the CIA RETIREMENT  
BOARD convened at 2:00 p.m. on Thursday, 17 February 1972, in room 5E62,  
Headquarters, with the following present:

25X1A9a Mr. Harry B. Fisher, Chairman  
[REDACTED] DDS&T  
[REDACTED] , DDI  
[REDACTED] DDS  
[REDACTED] , DDP  
[REDACTED] Legal Adviser  
25X1A9a Mr. [REDACTED] Executive Secretary  
Mr. [REDACTED] Technical Adviser  
Mrs [REDACTED] Recording Secretary  
25X1A9a Guests: Mr. [REDACTED], DDS&T, was invited  
25X1A9a to speak before the Board on behalf of  
Mr. [REDACTED]  
25X1A9a Mr. [REDACTED] Office of Security,  
25X1A9a was invited to speak before the Board on  
behalf of Mr. [REDACTED]  
25X1A9a Mr. [REDACTED], DDP, was invited to speak  
before the Board in his own behalf.

MR. FISHER: Well, can we take care of the 20 January  
Minutes? Have you all had a chance to look those over?

If there are no comments we will let those  
stand as written.


. . . The Minutes stand as written . . .

MR. FISHER: We have one young lady who has now  
completed her 15 years of Agency service and who appears to meet  
the criteria for designation as a participant - [REDACTED] 25X1A9a  
I would like a motion.

. . . This motion was then seconded and passed  
designating Miss [REDACTED] as a participant in the System . . . 25X1A9a

MR. FISHER: We now have 18 employees who have reached  
the five year mark in terms of service and who appear to meet the criteria  
for designation as participants. I would like a motion.

. . . This motion was then seconded and passed . . .



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MR. FISHER: I assume there are no problem areas on any of these?

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MR. [REDACTED] No.

MR. FISHER: Okay. Now we have three voluntary retirement cases - [REDACTED] 25X1A9a  
They are all past age 50 and they all have the necessary types of service.  
Do you have any others you want to add to these?

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[REDACTED] Yes, I have a few more.  
[REDACTED]

MR. FISHER: Okay. I would like a motion approving these.

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. . . This motion was then seconded and passed . . .

MR. FISHER: We now have [REDACTED] who is applying for involuntary retirement under CIARDS. He is 49 years old, has 31 years of Federal service, 24 years of Agency service, and plenty of qualifying service. I request a motion that we approve this.

. . . This motion was then seconded and passed . . .

MR. FISHER: Okay. That takes care of items 1 and 2 and we now move into item 3.

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You will recall that we had [REDACTED] case at the last meeting. He did have 47 good months and he needs 13 more for qualifying service.

I think last time we tended to agree that the six months of time serving as a full time guard and escort for Soviet defectors and a [REDACTED] of possible future importance was pretty good service. We had a little [REDACTED] trouble with the time that he spent at [REDACTED] which is only three months.

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██████████ Well, there is some ██████████ time in there -- a little bit anyway.

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MR. FISHER: Yes. Mr. ██████████ served under the supervision of ██████████ at that time, and we have ██████████ standing by if you would like to hear from him.

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MR. ██████████ I have a statement here also from that period of service. We couldn't find all the people involved with him at that time -- one was killed in an airplane crash and one is living in Rhode Island. But we did find ██████████ who served with him at that time and who gave me this statement. You could put it in the record if you wish.

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(Mr. ██████████ read this statement and it is attached below.)

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Re ██████████

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Mr. ██████████ Office of Finance, was assigned to ██████████ between December 1953 and August 1954. He remembers that Mr. ██████████ was there during part of this time. Mr. ██████████ said the project had its headquarters in ██████████ and base units operated out of there. Some were in Latin

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America. It was necessary to set up safehouses to which foreign nationals could be brought for briefing, debriefing and training. Agents were sent back into ██████████ and adjacent areas. Security teams had to serve as escorts as the agents were picked up from the areas and taken back to them. Agents had to be hand-held in the ██████████ area, polygraphed, etc.

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*Note  
himself does  
not claim this  
type of duty.*

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MR. FISHER: Well, he really says much more than the man himself said. How does he define agents? He talked about recruiting pilots and mechanics.

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MR. [REDACTED] Here he talks about [REDACTED] -- You know, real live agents.

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MR. FISHER: I liked it. Maybe we ought to hear [REDACTED] first.

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[REDACTED] Now that concerns the other block of time.

MR. FISHER: Yes, the AQUATONE service. It's entirely different and I assume that [REDACTED] is prepared to talk about that.

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. . . While waiting for [REDACTED] to appear as a witness, the Chairman started a discussion on the [REDACTED] case, as follows:

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MR. FISHER: Our other case is Mr. [REDACTED] This is a guy who keeps amazing records, doesn't he?

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[REDACTED] He's another one like [REDACTED]

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MR. FISHER: Well, [REDACTED] wrote a lot of words but they weren't quite this precise.

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MR. [REDACTED] This guy has a lot of the right words here.

MR. FISHER: It worries me sometimes that the man who does a good job of writing might convince us, and the man that hasn't does not convince us.

However, I still think that a tremendous amount of this time of pushing doorbells and checking on references is not qualifying within the meaning of the regulation. But as I go through this man's entire record of what he was supposed to have done in some of his investigations -- particularly, going into his surveillance activities, [REDACTED], and of course the fact that we are looking for 13 months rather than a full 60 months as we were in the case of Mr. [REDACTED] --

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[REDACTED] You are looking at paragraph seven now?

MR. FISHER: I have jumped around, yes. And you know, the nature of his problems on some of his investigations -- and again, I'm just throwing this out -- I have a sense that he must have had 13 months worth of this sort of thing. It isn't <sup>just</sup> the surveillance part of it.

As a matter of fact, it's unfortunate for him, but the time from June through September of 1947 is really pre-CIA. A few days of it might have been CIA and that's about as much as we could go. But then he has December of 1949 and January and February of 1950 - three months of surveillance.

[REDACTED] And he was an Agency employee with CIA, so you can count that.

I assume that if this was honest to goodness surveillance, he was still ducking around corners. It sounds like I'm talking for the man, but I'm just sort of rationalizing on my own. Now, the [REDACTED] we have tended to write off in the past.

[REDACTED] We have "DCI escort" on there.

MR. FISHER: You run into a thing like he guarded a meeting place. That's marginal. Then there's this procurement of

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[REDACTED] seem to be a major activity. He figures an average of four hours a week since 1955.

MR. FISHER: Yes. The recruiter support doesn't really mean too much. This financial investigation is a little difficult to get a grasp on. And this "hundreds" of cases from the DCI office I don't have too much feel on.

You then get into the number of visits into the high risk areas that he speaks about. It's hard for me to write that off all together.

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[REDACTED] Well, just how it bears on this I don't know.

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MR. [REDACTED] One thing that caught my eye -- back on the second page -- since 1946 he has posed as self-employed in public relations. And the preceding paragraph said that he used Government credentials during only about five percent of this period.

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. . . Mr. [REDACTED] arrived at this time . . .

MR. FISHER: We had gone on to another case, but we will back up now.

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I'm sure that Karl has briefed you, but specifically we are interested in this period of August, 1955, to September of 1956 - roughly, 13 months - during which time [REDACTED] served on project [REDACTED] and during which time you, obviously, were pretty much involved. And he did cite [REDACTED] as his direct supervisor.

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We are trying to get at the 13 months to see how much of it or all or none truly meets the criteria that we normally establish.

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[REDACTED] You might explain the criteria momentarily for John. I didn't go through them with him.

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MR. FISHER: Well, we do have a problem with some people who come here who think that sensitivity by itself brings you qualifying service. And obviously that can't, because there are a lot of people throughout all our buildings <sup>who</sup> ~~that~~ engage in sensitive work.

What we really have are certain guidelines that are spelled out pretty much in the statutes and regulations and they are either a degree of hazard - true hazard to life or limb - and that's one criteria. The second one -- and I think the only one we could really consider here -- is a rather stringent requirement to practice tradecraft in support of clandestine operations abroad. 25X1A9a

MR. [REDACTED] Well, I doubt that the first criteria could be met here. The second one very definitely, because it was the Office of Security people who had to devise - drawing from the experience, principally, of the Clandestine Service - procedures to accommodate a scientific approach to doing the collection program. The individuals in the Office of Security, who also had the responsibility then for cover, had to devise the procedures and then implement them.

In the case of Security - in as much as they were trail blazing in trying to put together a program that would entail large numbers of people - they had to practice what they preached. The other is the philosophy of the program leadership which was, from a T/O point of view, have as few people as possible in the program. Therefore, the individuals who comprise, for example, the security staff not only had to do the paperwork in Headquarters, but they had to go out and implement it. And this entailed clearing contractors, 25X1A13c

[REDACTED]

clearing of people.

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I think the chap in question was involved in



tain. So, the fellows in Security were operating under very stringent, self-imposed by-lines as well as living and practicing it.

But I think from the point of view of qualifying under this second criteria, I believe these fellows did. Now this didn't only apply to the Security people. It applied to all the people on the program. And I think Security and the contract people were the backbone of the program, because they brought in the expertise initially to set up a viable framework against which the whole program later was developed.

MR. FISHER: I'm a little concerned about your statement that it applied to everybody in the program. Are you really saying that everybody that was involved in AQUATONE did get into --

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MR. [REDACTED] Not in a total sense. But I'm saying the individuals in a broad sense certainly had applied to them the sensitivity aspects of it. But the individuals in security, communications, contracting - those who were actually involved in the operations at the test site and overseas - they were certainly under these constraints.

MR. FISHER: But for a minute let's say communications. Now again, communications always is sensitive activity and they have to have a secure code room and they send very sensitive traffic. But what problem did they really have in practicing tradecraft?

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MR. [REDACTED] In the security field?

MR. FISHER: Tradecraft as we think of it in the Clandestine Service. We think of it in a sense in which you are operating in an unfriendly environment and to the point where you try to do things covertly. Maybe you use disguises and you might have false documentation. You are living a truly clandestine type life.

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MR. [REDACTED] These were exactly the approaches that were taken in the recruitment of the pilots in the program, except for perhaps the tradecraft relating to the disguises. And in the case of cover, security, and the operations people, yes, they practiced it.

I'd like to make my comments specifically to the security aspect of the program. I don't want to encompass a broad generalization.

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[REDACTED] What kind of cover arrangement to [REDACTED] secure the real nature of the program was engaged in, John?

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MR. [REDACTED] Most people were placed under other than Agency cover.

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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MR. [REDACTED] Yes, and one did not use a central cover of the Agency.

This group of people that were thrown together had to draw on the expertise available in the Agency, but they were autonomous. And because of the nature of the program people are not readily cleared as in today's environment. There are very, very few people that are cleared, and as a result the individuals who had to use their home office support, for example, had to be very careful to operate within a compartmented arena. Security people obviously have to run traces on applicants, etc., and they had to work under very compartmented ground rules.

MR. FISHER: Again, you see, I certainly can understand from your standpoint how all of this looked like an extremely sensitive operation in which cover had to be protected. But to give you a little bit from our side -- To begin with, normally when people are under official cover, that in itself is beginning to say they don't have a major problem. Most of the people we are talking about were under non-official cover. They were operating without any backstopping of any kind.

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So, again, when they went out recruiting I'm sure they didn't say - "I'm with the [REDACTED] That, of course, I can see as being done under rather clandestine formats. But in their checking on people and in their reviewing of applicants, I fail to see where they had to practice a lot of tradecraft for that.

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I wish I could get a little more. Do any of you have this problem? I hear what John's saying, but it isn't coming through to me.

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MR. [REDACTED] I was in the Clandestine Service, initially, before I shifted to this program. I had an overseas assignment and although it wasn't behind the Curtain, I feel the tradecraft that was practiced by the initial [REDACTED] project group that was set up was drawing on the best that the Agency had to offer - putting it on paper procedurally and then implementing it.

And again, as opposed to Agency operations overseas where one deals with one or two people in a chain, these individuals had to deal with a large number of people, not only their Headquarters staff but the field units. They were dealing with military people and Agency people who had to be indoctrinated. And I must say, I was at Headquarters for about a three-year period prior to my assignment to this organization, and I had heard nothing about the program. I was amazed at the security that had been developed, and it's largely because of the work of the individuals who set up the program and practiced it.

MR. FISHER: I certainly agree that they maintained their cover and the integrity of this operation. But I'm still reaching and I would like to find a little more, like the flap potential to the Government. You know, the type of environment that endangers the man who is operating clandestinely, which is the thrust of this regulation. John, [REDACTED] do you see what I'm driving at?

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MR. [REDACTED] Yes. To put it another way, John, we talk about practicing tradecraft. Well, a lot of people in this building practice tradecraft at their desks, but when they go to the outside

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world they are either [REDACTED] or they are CIA. And as you say,

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these people were mostly [REDACTED].

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MR. [REDACTED] Yes.

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MR. [REDACTED] So, where were they practicing stringent tradecraft in their outside life? as opposed to at the desk and with the people that they were instructing. I think this is what Harry is trying to get at.

MR. FISHER: They were under official cover at an

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[REDACTED]

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MR. [REDACTED] I don't think this is the type of tradecraft we are talking about.

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MR. [REDACTED] No, but that's what I'm talking about.

MR. FISHER: On the CI Staff, they have people that are working on extremely sensitive operations. And to determine whether they really practiced tradecraft -- I'm afraid that the fact that they live at home and come to work everyday and do their job and then go home again would be an over-riding consideration.

How did they go about recruitment?

[REDACTED]

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Well, they practiced the tradecraft in that they were using pseudonyms - phony names.

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MR. FISHER: Who did the people think they were talking

to?

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MR. [REDACTED] Initially, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There were hurdles to be crossed by the potential candidate before a determination was made that the individual was acceptable, or willing perhaps, to get involved in something that smelled clandestine, after which the full story was revealed and the recruitment pitch was then made by professional people who were assigned to the project.

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I guess the thing that impressed me about the program was that the practice of the tradecraft -- as applied to this activity -- was dealing with large numbers of people and maintaining the discipline of dealing with large numbers of people, not only within the shop here but within the contract establishments. We have followed the same formats for the past ten or 15 years, and it was largely because of the individuals that were initially assigned to the program -- they were largely experienced hands from other parts of the Agency -- that we were able to perform without any major flaps. And I guess that's the proof.

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MR. [REDACTED] John, let me read the words here and

maybe it will help. (Mr. [REDACTED] read an excerpt from the regulation.) 25X1A9a

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MR. [REDACTED] Well, the personal cover, no. I

think for the personal cover one could - in today's environment here in the city - acquire a so-called [REDACTED] And with very little brain power anyone can implement it.

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MR. FISHER: I know you are very sincere in your feeling that these people did a very good job in protecting cover, but I could hope that, if it's successful and the cover is maintained throughout, that everybody associated with that would also have what you are saying. And yet, I have a feeling that they, too, wouldn't have been practicing truly clandestine covert tradecraft to protect their cover.

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This is the distinction we try to make.

Otherwise we would be opening up to people who, in our opinion, were not contemplated.


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There is one section of [REDACTED] letter where he says he acted as Case Officer during the training and operational assignment of pilots who were recruited. What do you suppose he meant by "Case Officer"?


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MR. [REDACTED] The technique in the early days was to assign personnel or Security Officers as a handholder for that



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MR. FISHER: For the pilots, because I assume that the handholding was just that.



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MR. [REDACTED] I would like to comment on John's statement in that having spent months of my life overseas in these trade practices, I can easily recognize and accept what he calls stringent security --

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MR. FISHER: To maintain your personal cover.

MR. [REDACTED] Yes, but it's in the United States rather than overseas. Now, where we draw the line I don't know. Of course, I'm easily convinced that they had the right trade practices.

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MR. [REDACTED] I'm not pre-empting you, John, but there is a question of getting the contractors to learn these kinds of procedures, too. Anybody can write a contract to do that airplane, but to do it security wise --

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
MR. [REDACTED] And which was within the contractor plant and which was brand new to the contractors getting involved in the game -- with the exception of the Manhattan project, which required the same type of discipline, there was no other one that I'm aware of.

And these people had to go, initially, ensuring that these contacts were people that [REDACTED] would supply a name or two that would be reviewed and cleared. And the individuals would go in for substantive discussions. We had the competent contract people from Logistics assigned specially to the program, but the "procedural tradecraft," as well as the initial implementation, was largely under theegis of the Security people covering their colleagues into these establishments and ensuring that within these establishments a proper compartmented program was set up. There was an educational process here and it was largely the skills of the Security people who were responsible for their maintaining the integrity of that type of an operation.

Now, this was scattered over a broad base of contractors. Cameras had to be built from scratch and an airplane air frame had to be built. One had to go out and get film and pilots. And most of this was then trail blazing the state of the art, so it was a complex set up.

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So, in the total context, one had to have the discipline throughout the life of the program to maintain it's covery-ness.

MR. FISHER: The question again is. - and I'm really not trying to play him down - but there are other classified Government programs that require industrial security to compartment them. I guess in addition this was an effort to keep CIA out of it. So you have that one other step. And NSA might have a project to develop some unique piece of equipment, too. But this thing, by its very size, is a big air frame -- which is unique.

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MR. [REDACTED] I would mention another incident which I think might also clarify the extent to which security had to be practiced. Since this airplane, initially, was designed to fly over 55,000 feet, we worried then about the FAA controllers who were on the ground, or the military controllers who had radars and who might have been able to discern this airplane flying at this unique altitude.

In order to ensure that if this occurred and this information could be squelched, one had to make a survey of the potential of this occurring and the individuals on the program had to then ferret out the senior people in Government - or at the appropriate levels of various locations those individuals who would have access to this information - for the purpose of squelching it. A brief/debrief type of thing.

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So it was a massive effort. Again, it was largely the work of the Security people to format this.

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[REDACTED] John, after July 1956 when operations began and the Russians were aware of what was going on, what changes then took place in this whole procedure?

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[REDACTED] There was no change in the basic procedure, except as the airplanes began flying the second phase cover was implemented, and that is that this was an airplane built for weather reconnaissance purposes.

So at each stage of the operation there was a cover and tradecraft security employed. The first approach was - let us get an airplane built as quickly as possible under the most covert circumstances as possible to forestall the opposition from developing a countermeasure to it early. And this was the requirement for the initial secrecy.

The other was by setting up a contractual relationship with the designers, one was able to develop contracting techniques to remove the normal bureaucracy from contracting arrangements to enable the contractor to build and fly the airplane within the shortest possible time. And in this case it was flown within nine months, which as you know was unprecedented then and is unprecedented today. And the momentum to get this thing fielded in the shortest possible time under the covert ground rules was the desire of [REDACTED] the program director, and it was a thing that instilled the entire group of people on the program to believe it.

I guess of all things it was the energies of the individuals who worked night and day that finally caused this thing to reach fruition. But when one gets involved in a program of that sort, where the urgency seemed to be so indoctrinated into the people, the people just threw their lives into it. It took this type of a combination of effort to field it.

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██████████ Maybe that will help us in future cases, though, when people start claiming it on this.

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MR. ██████████ I'm trying to think of people who were on the scene: ██████████ I think, whom you may know. He was one of the original people. Also, ██████████. He was among the first Security Officers. There was ██████████. Also,

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25X1A9a ██████████ who was in the field. He was part of this. And of course you can always get access to ██████████ who pops into the city every now and then. And I think that would be a good idea if you want an authoritative view from his standpoint.

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MR. FISHER: Well, I think we have gotten a pretty good view of this from you.

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MR. ██████████ Well, I would have been happier to have more of my Case Officers overseas practice the tradecraft and procedures they did on this project in the United States. We never equaled that.

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. . . Mr. ██████████ withdrew from the meeting at this time . . .

MR. FISHER: I'm tortured with this one. You say tradecraft and I agree, but they didn't have a problem maintaining their personal cover. That's the difference.

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. . . Mr. ██████████ then appeared as a witness in the case of ██████████ . . .

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MR. FISHER: Jim, we are trying to go back in time

25X1A6a here to ██████████ Apparently there is only a three-month period involved  
25X1A9a for ██████████ and we are just trying to get a feel of what type of activity he was involved in during that time.

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MR. [REDACTED] I could see where a lot of that would fall within the purview of his activities down there. They used to run houses, cars, and you know, they would escort and probably pick up at the plane documents coming from Headquarters - top secret documents - and bring them back to the project.

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MR. FISHER: But to your knowledge, was he living on a base which was isolated? to keep the [REDACTED]

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MR. [REDACTED] That's my understanding. They had a section [REDACTED] there that was isolated, and that's where they kept these people. So he was confined, I guess, to that area most of the time.

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MR. FISHER: But to your knowledge, did he have regular exposure to these agents?

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MR. [REDACTED] I would guess so, yes, because he was probably honchoing them. I think they may have had some contract types doing guard duty, so he probably supervised them.

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MR. [REDACTED] Did you ever go down there?

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MR. [REDACTED] No. My observations were just from Headquarters. I was in the support end - operational support - but [REDACTED] was the man who was handling it from Headquarters and who was the project manager. However, he met with a very untimely death sometime ago.

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MR. FISHER: [REDACTED] is not around, is he?

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[REDACTED] is in Florida. He's retired, but I'm sure you could get to him if you wanted to.

. . . Mr. [REDACTED] left the meeting at this time . . .

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MR. [REDACTED] Well, I returned to the statements of this man who was in [REDACTED] at the time - this [REDACTED] He was in

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[REDACTED] during the period that we are talking about. (Mr. [REDACTED] again read this statement which is attached on page 3 of this transcript.)

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. . . Mr. [REDACTED] then appeared as a witness in his own behalf . . .

MR. FISHER: We are trying to review some of this domestic service that you have identified here, [REDACTED] We don't have too much trouble with certain segments of it, but with others we feel we have to know a little bit more about it.

Now again, I assume you have a pretty good idea of the guidelines for what constitutes domestic qualifying service, and I repeat only to help you in identifying that type of work.

We aren't concerned too much with how sensitive an operation may have been, or even necessarily the protection of the official cover of some installation. The language is pretty much stringent practice of covert tradecraft to protect your own personal cover.

And so, within that context, can you tell us a little about what went on in [REDACTED] for three months?

MR. [REDACTED] Yes, and I might say that at the time all this was taking place I was actually assigned to the Office of Security. Since that time I have been in the DDP, so I think I can equate the type of experience that you are speaking of here.

In the [REDACTED] experience I was assigned to the Office of Security. We supported this [REDACTED] PBSUCCESS project with [REDACTED] and back here at Headquarters [REDACTED], who is since deceased, asked me to go down there to be [REDACTED] assistant Security Officer in [REDACTED]

I went down and shortly after arriving there Jack said: "Well, [REDACTED], you can forget that you are a Security Officer. We are all supporting the operation and we do lots of different things." I found that out and shortly thereafter I was immediately put to the

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MR. FISHER: Are there any other questions?

(No response.)

Thanks very much, [REDACTED]

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. . . Mr. [REDACTED] left the meeting at this time . . . 25X1A9a

MR. FISHER: You really do better by talking to the people themselves.

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MR. [REDACTED] Well, a lot he didn't put in this paper.

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MR. [REDACTED] You said something about his papers being clear. He's pretty clear, too.

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MR. [REDACTED] Well, the alias wasn't mentioned in his paper.

MR. FISHER: Now, the industrial security business of going to contractors -- that really leaves me pretty cold. If we open that up, we have an awful lot of people there. Every contracting officer in Logistics goes in under security conditions to conduct it. Now, it still isn't going to help us a lot. That knocks out  $\frac{1}{4}$  of his time if he's right. He started out with - "3/4 of my time was recruiting and handholding." [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] -- Well, you have a feeling the guy knew what was coming off in the beginning.

But okay, that in itself didn't sound like a very touchy thing. But for nine months he banged around the country in an alias and with documentation - false but official.

[REDACTED]

MR. FISHER: Let's just back off a minute to [REDACTED] and then come back. While I can't feel terribly sorry for him living at the [REDACTED] for a couple of weeks, once again he was out

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under a [REDACTED] The rest of his time

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at [REDACTED] -- If you listen to something like your Finance man wrote, it's like he's talking about two different places. Now, this man admits he never saw [REDACTED]

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I think what's bothering me now is that this man is down and needing three months at [REDACTED] It's a very tough 25X1A6a one. If this fellow had no overseas service and was looking for four or five years of this sort of thing, I just couldn't see it at all. But once again, we have made life much tougher ourselves by having a regulation instead of a law, as your people in Justice were telling you the other day, John. The statute says employment clearly different from other Government employment. You know, we wouldn't have very much trouble saying this is not normal Government employment.

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MR. [REDACTED] He only needs six and a half months out of 47 months. I think he wants to retire.

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MR. [REDACTED] He says he understands that the involuntary thing may be cut off, but he doesn't say he's going to take advantage of it.

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MR. FISHER: He implies it.

MR. [REDACTED] wrote this back in September, 1971.

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MR. FISHER: Well, where do we stand on this? is there any kind of consensus? I don't think we can depend on the man retiring, nor is he committing himself to it. And it's not pertinent.

MR. [REDACTED] Well, he has more service than he did before. You said 47 months and one day. I think he has about six more months and two weeks, anyway.

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MR. [REDACTED] I feel that way, too. I don't think he has 60 months, but if you want to stretch a point and say yes, I could live with that. But I don't think he has the qualifying service.

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MR. [REDACTED] If he was getting out in a couple of months,  
I think we could.

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MR. [REDACTED] Should we talk to him to see whether he  
will retire before 30 June?

MR. FISHER: I don't think it's that critical. I  
don't want to sound like too much of a purist, but we have been given  
particular qualifying service to identify. It's not like 1969 when  
we said we would be liberal if they were leaving.

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[REDACTED] He's now in WH, isn't he? isn't he  
going overseas?

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MR. FISHER: He's in DDP now.

MR. [REDACTED] We thought that so much of this service  
was outside of the DDP that we really weren't qualified to determine  
this.

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[REDACTED] I suggest we table it and think a little  
more about it.

. . . Mr. Fisher was reminded of a meeting he  
had scheduled with Mr. Colby at 3:30 p.m. . . .

MR. FISHER: Do you fellows want to take the next  
case while I'm gone? I'm sorry to leave like this but I have to see  
Mr. Colby.

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. . . Mr. Fisher withdrew from the meeting at this  
time . . .

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MR. [REDACTED] There is no hurry on [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] I don't think there is any hurry on the  
next case either. We have been at it for an hour and a half now.

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MR. [REDACTED] Do you think you will want anyone from  
Security on the next case?

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MR. [REDACTED] Why don't we table both of them?

[REDACTED] I think we should.

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MR. [REDACTED] I think Harry should participate in the decision process on both of these.

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[REDACTED] Who can we get for [REDACTED] here?

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MR. [REDACTED] I don't think we need anyone for [REDACTED] because he spelled it all out.

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[REDACTED] Why don't you get somebody that knows this fellow?

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MR. [REDACTED]: I'll talk to Mr. Fisher and see if he has any suggestions.

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MR. [REDACTED] I think [REDACTED] has a good case, myself. He needs six months out of that AQUATONE time and he said 3/4 of that time was recruitment. And if you believe him, then for 3/4 of that AQUATONE time he was under alias and moving around the country. I think that's an important consideration.

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[REDACTED] But it's a different concept of clandestinity, really, than what we are working with.

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MR. [REDACTED] I think he did a good job, but I don't see living under [REDACTED] I guess what I'm saying is that I'm not sure it's a good clandestine job.

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MR. [REDACTED] If we can narrow this down to just six more months, we will send him on TDY.

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MR. [REDACTED] Well, in effect you have done that.

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MR. [REDACTED] You picked up the defector time, so he only needs six more months out of 13, and with this new two weeks of time we gave him he has  $47\frac{1}{2}$  months.

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MR. [REDACTED] If you take part of the [REDACTED] time, you can reduce it even more.

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MR. [REDACTED] How much time does he lack all together?

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MR. [REDACTED] About  $6\frac{1}{2}$  months.

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MR. [REDACTED] Unfortunately, if you do that, then  
the 30 June date will be past.

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MR. [REDACTED] Well, we can still get him under the  
1973 date.

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MR. [REDACTED] But as far as he himself knows, that's  
the end of the involuntary.

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MR. [REDACTED] But if he gets in the System he wouldn't  
need that.

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MR. [REDACTED] How much service does he have?

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MR. [REDACTED] 25 years.

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[REDACTED] He's 46 and has 25 years. So that's  
why he's interested in the involuntary.

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. . . The cases of Mr. [REDACTED] and  
Mr. [REDACTED] were tabled until the  
next meeting . . .

. . . The meeting adjourned at 3:45 p.m. . . .

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